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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS
IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I.
THE MAJORITY OPINION IS PRECISELY
CORRECT IN ITS DETERMINATION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
Defendants request, for the first time in their petition
for rehearing, that the Court consider what they claim i&
an electronic recording of a statement by a State employee
to the Utah Senate.
At all times since the filing of the first pleading in
this action, defendants have been fully aware that the con-
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struction of Section 6'5-1-18 was a key issue. Apparently
defendants have at all times known of the whereabouts of
the recording and of what the state employee said to the
Senators. Why, then, have defendants waited until now to
present it? Why have defendants never before advised
counsel, the lower courts or this Court of the existence of
the recording?
As the record shows, plaintiffs then and now, have
sought the fullest consideration of the important issues
presented in and by this action. 1 It is likely that had defendants at any time so requested, counsel for plaintiffs
would have stipulated to the consideration by the Trial Court
of the employee's statement and the Senate hearings including, of course, the context and, if the statement had
been deemed important, called the employee as a witness
and examined him under oath. These evidentiary protections would not be available to this Court nor to the plaintiffs if the recording were to now be considered through
judicial notice.
But in any event, the polint the defendants claim will
be clarified - the legislative intent - is settled law, res
adjudicata, by reason of the unanimous decision of this
Court in 1968:
1

E.g., plaintiffs requested, and the Trial Court ordered, that the en·
tire record, including all exhibits, of the 1968 Morgan case be made
part of the record herein so that this Court might have full access to
all pertinent information, including legislative history, pertaining to
the subject statute. That record is enclosed in manilla envelopes and
part of the record in this case.

"We are of the opinion that the Legislature by the
statute adopted in 1967 [the identical statute before
the court in the case at bar, to wit, 65-1-18 U. C. A.]
intended and did adopt the policy of allowing but
one lease for the extraction of oil from any
particular tract of public land (citing) ." Morgan
et al. v. Utah Board of State Lands, 21 Utah 2d 364
at 367, 445 P. 2d 776 ( 1968).
The Court should deny defendants' belated request to
reopen because (a) the point of statutory construction was
settled by this Court in 1968; (b) the request is well beyond
the perimeters of Utah's judicial notice statute (78-25-1
U, C. A.), ( c) the defendants failed to make a proffer at
any time to this Court or the lower court, and (d) plaintiffs
would now be unable to counter, respond to, or place in
proper context, the statement.
But the most important reason why this Court should
deny reopening is simply that whatever the employee's
statement contains, it is wholly unnecessary to the accurate
determination by this Court of the intent of the legislature.
The Court in the 1968 Morgan case explained the way
in which the conflicts in leasing came into existence and
the manner in which the Legislature determined to solve
the conflicts :
"The oil and gas lease was designed and intended
to permit the lessee to recover the mobile oil which
would flow to a bore hole in a liquid state. The
bituminous sands lease was intended to permit the
lessee to recover the oil from the rock formation
itself. The Land Board adopted the practice of issuing two leases on the same lands to different lessees,
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one permitting the extraction of oil in the usual
process of drilling and the flow of oil by natural
pressure or by pumping; and the second form of
lease permitted the extraction of oil from the rock
formation. It would appear at that time the only
practical process of recovering oil from the bituminous sands was by mining and quarrying the rock
and thereafter processing the same to recover the
oil therefrom. With new developments in the extraction and recovery of oil it became feasible to
recover oil from the bituminous sands formations
by the application of heat, pressure and by the use
of certain types of detergents. These newer methods
permitted the extraction of oil from the rock formations without removing the same by mining or
similar process. In order to forestall disputes be-

tween the lessees as to whether a given quantity of
o# came from a bituminous sands formation or from
a natural reservoir of oil, it was determined that
one lease should be issued which would cover all of
the oil produced on the lands regardless of its
source." (Emphasis added.) Ibid, at p. 366.

The 1968 Morgan decision dealt specifically with bituminous sands. Defendants stress this point, which certainly is a distinction without any (scientific or legal)
difference to the case at bar. The 1968 Morgan case held
that the oil recoverable from bituminous sands is identical
to that recoverable from liquid pools. (21 Utah 2d 364, at
365.) The Trial Court herein expressly, on competent and
uncontroverted evidence, similarly found with respect to
shale oil:
"That the mineral or minerals recoverable from oil
shale in the Green River Formation underlying certain lands in Utah is the same mineral as is or the
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same minerals as are recoverable from liquid petroleum in the Said Green River Formation, to wit,
oil and/or gasoline, and/or distillates" (R. 107).
Assuming arguendo (and plaintiff's counsel has no
idea of the whereabouts or contents of the recording) that
the State employee did tell the Senate what he wanted in
the bill, what assistance is thereby provided to the Court?
Plaintiffs concede that several state employees may have
urged the Legislature to expressly exempt oil shale from
that portion of Senate Bill 77 now codified as 65-1-18 U.
C. A. The dispositive fact is, however, that the Legislature, despite such urging (including, perhaps, that of the
employee on the recording) did not do so. The important
determination is not what was asked of the Senators but
rather what was the response of the Senators in the form
of the bill itself: What was the intent of the Legislature
(as distinguished from the intent of a state employee) in
adopting 'Senate Bill 77 as finally worded.
If this were a case where the intent of the legislature
were obscure or difficult to ascertain, plaintiffs might well
concur in asking the Court to consider extraneous materials. But this is not a case where this Court must search
outside the statute for that intent.
The State Legislature, vested with control over management of State lands, in precise language in the statute
itself, (65-1-18 U. C. A.) grants, defines and limits the
authority of the State Land Board ("the state land board
may"). The Legislature permits more than one mineral
lease providing, however, that the Board "shall include in

ti

such lease suitable stipulations for simultaneous operation."
And what of those situations where geologic conditions ren.
der it impossible for the Board to provide stipulations which
will permit "simultaneous operation" without inherent and
basic conflict? The Legislature then changed its criterion
from "minerals" to "purpose" and expressly and deliberately instructed: "The Board shall not issue more than
one outstanding lease for the same purpose on the same
land." (Emphasis added supra.) Both defendants' and
plaintiffs' expert witnesses testified that the only purpoBe
for leasing or development of oil shale was to obtain oil
and gas: oil shale has no other value or purpose.
Thus, in effect, the Legislature prohibited the Board
of State Lands from issuing more than one lease on the
same lands if to do so would create such conflict as to prohibit the development of the minerals. This was also the
consensus of the petroleum industry which sponsored the
statute and urged its adoption by the Legislature. See,
hearings, Official Report of Proceedings Before the Land
Board of the State of Utah, "In the Matter of a Public Hearing on Proposed Asphaltic and Bituminous Sands Lease and
Oil Shale Leases". These hearings, which are the true legislative, history of Senate Bill 77, are before this Court as
Exhibit P-18. (See footnote 1 supra.)
Dr. Osmond, the defendants' own expert witness, participated in the Land Board hearings which urged Senate
Bill 77. Dr. Osmond's testimony in the lower court solidly
supported the majority opinion's construction of the legislative intent: The objective was to end conflicts in the
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leasing and production of hydrocarbons. (Dr. Osmond's
testimony is set out in part in Respondents' Brief at pp.
12-13; in full, in the Record at pp. 166-199 and his testimony at the 1965 hearings at pp. 218-221 of Exhibit P-18.)
Beyond question (and the defendants have candidly not
attempted to refute this point) the sole and only "purpose"
for which any of the several hydrocarbon 2 leases are sought
or issued is

the production of oil.
(Finding of Fact Number 4, Conclusion of Law Number 4,
R. 108-109.) Here, too, the testimony of defendants' expert witness, Dr. Osmond, fully supports this conclusion.
Dr. Osmond's testimony on this point is quoted in part on
pp. 8-10 of Respondents' Brief and at R. 152-153, 184, 192.
See also, Osmond, R. 170-171; Dr. Christiansen, R.
The statute is unambiguous and its· intent and objective are correctly achieved by the majorify opinion. This
determination should end the matter.
But the dissent, strenuously urged by defendants, expresses an understandable concern : What are the consequences of this interpretation, however unassailable it may
be as a matter of statutory construction, to the development
of Utah's hydrocarbon reserves? Here, too, the majority
2

0n cross examination by the attorneys for the defendants, Dr. Christiansen outlined in detail the criteria for classification of the various
hydrocarbons and concluded: " ... Basically, they're the same carbon
and hydrogen compounds that vary from the heaviest to the lightest"
(R. 163).
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opinion is eminently sound, as submitted in the following
argument.

POINT II.
THE MAJORITY OPINION ELIMINATES CONFLICTS AND MAKES POSSIBLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF UTAH'S HYDROCARBON RESERVES; THE INTERPRETATION SOUGHT
BY THE DEFENDANTS WOULD NULLIFY
THE STATUTE AND PARALYZE HYDROCARBON DEVELOPMENT IN UTAH.
Defendants, in their rehearing brief (Point C) are
beating a dead horse in re-arguing (as they did in the 1968
Morgan case, to the two lower courts and to this Court in
this action) that there is a discernable difference between
a block of kerogen (or, as in the earlier Morgan case, a
block of bituminous sand) and a vial of liquid petroleum:
There just is no dispute on that point. 3 The issues before
the Court do not involve consideration of anything as scientifically complex as the atomic composition of the several
hydrocarbons - the obfuscatory issue the defendants raise
in their rehearing brief - but, rather, turn on what the
Legislature intended by Senate Bill 77 (and particularly
65-1-18) and what are the consequences to the development
of Utah's hydrocarbon deposits. The first issue, legislative
intent, is dealt with hereinabove. The second issue, the
consequences, is treated hereunder.
8 See

Note 2, supra.

The majority opinion correctly holds that if the Board
of State Lands is permitted to issue shale leases on top of
leases for other hydrocarbons the inherent and inevitable
conflict will preclude development by either lessee. This
is also precisely the holding of this court in the 1968 Morgan
case with respect to bituminous sands. 4 Both holdings are
unassailable.
The majority opinion is completely supported by the
fact findings of the Trial Court and by the record on appeal.
Essentially the question of conflict is a question of fact:
Can oil be produced from oil shale - in Utah without conflict with other lessees of the same land
seeking to produce oil from other hydrocarbons in
the same formations?
The defendants have led the dissenting opinion into
significant error on several important points, (all of which
are contrary to the findings of the trial court which heard
the evidence) :
1. "Such is not the case with oil shale, [distinguishing bituminous sands per the earlier Morgan case]
for oil shale cannot be made to flow from the shale.
It is necessary to mine the shale, and when it is
brought to the surface of the ground, there is no oil
in it...."
'Plaintiffs are wholly at a loss to understand how, given the undisputed fact that petroleum in bituminous sand and petroleum in shale
is the same mineral (varying, as the two experts testified, only in
the atomic arrangement of the carbon and hydrogen molecules), must
be produced in essentially identical fashion, and the determination
by the Court in 1968 of the legislative intent that a single lease was
essential to avoidance of conflicts, the dissent could summarily conclude that "The prior Morgan case is of no assistance in deciding
this matter."
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(Contra: U. S. Bureau of Mines publication, Ex
hibit P-13, infra.)

2. "There can be no conflict between a lessee who
mines oil shale and a lessee who produces oil through
holes drilled in the ground."
(Contra: Utah Geological and Mineralogical Survey
Publication, Exhibit P-6 and P-14, infra.) 5

The sound rationale for the statute - both that portion permitting several leases and that prohibiting leases
for the same purpose - is clear. It is possible to permit
the production of, say, lead-silver-zinc by conventional mining methods at, say a 500 foot depth, and a lease on the
same land for mobile oil and gas at a depth of, say, 3500
to 5000 feet. The "purpose" of the leases is not the same.
And no conflict exists. Both undertaking are compatible.
"Simultaneous operation" (per 65-1-18) is entirely feasible.
It is possible to postulate a situation where one lease for
surface extraction of sand and gravel, another lease at 500
5The oil shale portion of the official publication of the Utah Geo·
logical and Mineralogical Survey is included in the record on appeal as both Exhibit P-6 and Exhibit P-14. Because of the significance of this publication, and its scientifically unassailable con·
clusions that oil shale, in Utah, must be produced at depth, by insitu methods, Plaintiffs desire the Court, as did the Trial Court, to
have the full context. The entire book has been lodged by Plaintiffs
with the Clerk of this Court should the Court wish to examine the
authority of the publication, its authenticity, the context and import
of the related studies, etc. The entire volume is probably judicially
noticeable as an act of the executive. See State Board of Land Commissioners v. Ririe, 56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59 (1920). Plaintiffs must
wonder why, in their citation of authorities on statutory construction, defendants did not cite this Utah case to the Court. In
any event, Judge Gideon's analysis of statutory construction and
judicial notice is most instructive and, we submit, fully supports the
majority opinion in the case at bar.
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feet for lead-silver-zinc, and a third lease for oil and gas
at 5000 feet, would be compatible. But what about an oil
shale lease on lands under lease for oil and gas, or conversely, an oil and gas lease on lands under lease for oil
shale?
An established geologic fact, crucial to this case, is that
the oil shale deposits in Utah are deep and the richest concentrations in barrels per acre are the deepest. Defendants'
expert testified that the Green River formation (the situs
of the shale) "is about 7,000 feet thick, and it thins to zero
on the margins of the old sedimentary basin" (R. 172).
(Compare the shale oil concentration and depths on the
map set out at p. 212 of the publication of the Utah Geological and Mineralogical Survey, Exhibits P-6 and P-14.)
No one - including the defendants - can honestly contend
that these rich petroleum deposits can ever be "mined" at
such depths. Beyond question, such deposits must be recovered in place - in-situ - using now workable thermal
processes.
The State publication (Exhibits P-6 and P-14) (quoting
U. S. Bureau of Mines Report No. 5081) concludes:
"All the oil and gas fields are concentrated in or
near areas of greatest 'shale oil' reserve. Is not this
concrete evidence of the indigenous nature of the
oil and gas in Green River reservoirs?

"* * * Multiple use of the same area for the
production of oil and gas by two entirely different
extraction techniques would not be possible. The
cost of immunizing one technique from harm by the
other would be prohibitive." Oil and Gas Possibili-

· ties of Utah Re-Evaluated, published by the Utah
Geological and Mineralogical Survey affiliated with
the College of Mines and Mineral Industries, University of Utah (1963) at p. 213.
Dr. Francis W. Christiansen, a renown scholar and
geologist, testified at trial that it is impossible to extract
petroleum6 from a liquid pool and oil shale on the same land
without conflict because
"The shale and liquid are in the same formation"
(R. 152) and because "Many think that the Green
River Formation, the oil shale unit, is a source
spread, that these lenses of porous and permeable
rock would have both oil and gas in them in the
sense of the fluid hydrocarbon content" (R. 159).
The official publication of the State of Utah (Exhibits
P-6 and P-14) clearly further makes the factual case supporting the majority opinion:
"There can be no doubt that the full potential of the
oil shale reserves in Utah can be developed only
when we have learned to retort and produce the oil
from the shale in place. Otherwise, we are limited
by the percentage of oil shale that can be removed
from an Underground mine and by the depth that
we can economically mine and lift the oil shale.
Then, too, the disposal of the ash becomes an enor6Even the Latin derivation of the word "petroleum" - petr: rock,
oleum: oil - that is, oil derived from rock, supports this position.
The definition of "petroleum":
"1: An oily flammable bituminous liquid that may vary from
almost colorless to black, occurs in many places in the upper
strata of the earth, is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons with
small amounts of other substances, and is prepared for use as
gasoline, naptha, or other products by various refining processes."
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, (1969), p. 632.
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mous and costly problem.
p. 210.

* * *" Ibid, supra, at

The publication of the Utah Geological and Mineralogical Survey cited above (Exhibits P-6 and P-14) wherein
the feasibility of production of oil shale by mining is pointed
out and the need for· a workable in-situ method presented
was published in 1964. 1 Since that time there have been
revolutionary breakthroughs in in-situ technology. Here,
too, the Court need not reach beyond the record. Exhibit
P-13 is an Official Release of the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, of June 16, 1969.
The dissent, in making the statement "Oil cannot be made
to flow from the shale. It is necessary to mine the shale,
and when it is brought to the surface of the ground, there
is no oil in it.... "must not have been apprised of the U.S.
Bureau of Mines Release (Exhibit P-13) which describes
precisely how oil is, in fact, "made to flow from the shale":
"Oil has been successfully recovered from oil shale
without mining it in a pioneering experiment being
conducted by the Interior Department's Bureau of
Mines in Sweetwater County, Wyo., it was reported
today.
"Initial results of the experiment, which was begun
in 1967, are described in a new technical publication
just released by the Department.
"The technique, called 'in-situ retorting', involves
fracturing shale underground, then heating it to
The Interior Department determination cited by the dissenting opinion was also rendered in 1964. That determination may well not be
federal policy today. In any event, because the federal agency has
created irreconcilable conflict in its leases is certainly no basis for
urging Utah to do likewise.
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convert organic matter into oil, which is recovered
through wells.

"* * * Oil shale is a non-porous stone containing an organic substance, kerogen, that turns into
oil when heated to about 900 degrees Fahrenheit.
Oil content of the Nation's shale deposits considered
potentially suitable for commercial recovery is estimated at 500 billion barrels .... "
U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
News Release, (June 16, 1969).
It is worth noting that the very lease the defendants
seek to issue in conflict with prior leases recognizes that
in-situ retorting is the method to be employed:
"The Lessee. shall have no right under this lease to
recover any substance, either combustible or noncombustible, which is produced in a gaseous or rarified state at ordinary temperature and pressure
conditions· other than gas which results from
formation of kerogen in oil shale by artificial introduction of heat ... " Utah State Lease for Oil Shale.
It is also worth noting that there are now a number
of workable patents· for in-situ production. See, e.g., U. S.
Patent Number 3,237,689 issued on March 1, 1966, "Dis·
tillation of Underground Deposits of Solid Carbonaceous
Materials In Situ" filed April 29, 1963; Canadian Patent
No. 832,829 issued on January 27, 1970, "In Situ Distilla·
tion and Hydrogenation of Carbonaceous Materials" filed

on May 26, 1967.

It is understandable why the dissent, led by the defendants into the incorrect assumptions of fact noted above,
would conclude that the majority opinion was not sound.
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Eliminating these errors, there can be no doubt - none at
all - that the majority opinion is not only sound, .both :as
to statutory construction and as a matter of scientific geologic fact, but that the majority opinion provides the only
interpretation which can avoid creation of the conflicts
which would prove to be catastrophic for Utah's incipie:at
oil shale industry. 8

POINT III.
OTHER LEGISLATIVE
ARE
WHOLLY CONSISTENT WITH THE MAJORITY OPINION.
Defendants repeat again their sterile argument that
certain statutes adopted since Senate Bill 77 are inconsistent with Section 65-1-18 U. C. A. This argument was
dealt with at length in Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at pp. 21-22.
But even applying the defendants' argument - that subsequent legislative enactments must be considered in determining legislative intent - the majority opinion is found
to be correct. The Utah Legislature has met at 4 sessions
Plaintiffs and their counsel do not have the foggiest notion as to the
basis, if there is one, for the statements that defendants' counsel urge
upon the Court and defendant Hansen has repeatedly made to the
news media that the majority opinion's construction will set back
shale oil development for a number of years. See, e.g., Hansen's
statement to the S. L. Tribune, March 26, 1971, on page B-12. Whatever Mr. Hansen's motivations in making these public statements,
the record establishes that he is dead wrong and he chose not to
provide a shred of support for such statements when he testified in
this case (R. 201 et seq.) and plaintiffs had the opportunity (which
they do not have when he makes statements at press conferences)
of cross examination. Contra, e.g., publication of Utah Geological
and Mineralogical Survey, Exhibits P-6 and P-14, at p. 210, supra.
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(2 were general) and the statutes cited by the defendants
directing the Board's activities in oil shale development were
adopted. Yet the significance of these legislative acts is
that the Legislature, aware as it was of this Court's 1968
construction, chose not to in any way amend 65-1-18, thereby adopting and ratifying the construction placed on the
statute by this Court. All the Legislators would have had
to do, if - as defendants argue - they disagreed with
this Court's 1968 interpretation, would have been to amend
65-1-18 by adding· the words "excepting oil shale." The
Legislature did not do so. But the defendants, in their remarkable determination, now ask this Court, by adopting
defendants' argument, to do that amending for them.

POINT IV.
THE SOLE OBJECTIVE OF THIS LAWSUIT
IS TO ASSURE CONFLICT-FREE DEVELOPMENT OF UTAH'S ENORMOUS HYDROCARBON RESERVES.
Defendants assert in their rehearing brief that "The
implications [of this case] go beyond these parties and the
issues here presented" (Br. p. 2). The defendants' questioning of the motives and intentions of the plaintiffs in
bringing this action is repeated in the dissenting opinion.
Plaintiffs appreciate the opportunity this responsive brief
presents to answer that challenge.
Defendants stress that the lease directlYy. involved in
this action excludes oil shale. That is true.
the bi·
tuminous sands lease was converted to this oil, gas and
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hydrocarbon lease, oil shale was withheld, even though the
lease was issued solely for the purpose of extracting oil.
This action on the part of the Land Board was in direct and
flagrant violation of the intent of the Legislature (65-1-18)
and ( 65-1-96), and a knowing and arrogant defiance of
the "single lease" holding of this very Court in 1968. Here
the Land Board had a perfect opportunity to comply with
the mandate of the Statute as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, wherein the Court stated :
"We are of the opinion that the Legislature by the
statute adopted in 1967 intended and did adopt the
policy of allowing but one lease for the extraction
of oil from any particular tract ·Of public land (citing). "Morgan et al. v. Utah Board of State Lands,
21 Utah 2d 364 at 367, 445 P. 2d 776 (1968).
(Emphasis added.)
But the Land Board determined upon a policy of conflict
and confusion by issuing the conversion lease without including oil shale. It was precisely this fragmenting of hydrocarbon leases which provided the impetus for adoption
of Senate Bill 77, which was probably the most important
'Statute ever adopted by the Utah Legislature as far as development of Utah's hydrocarbon reserves is concerned.
The interest and concern of the entire petroleum industry
was evident at the hearings (Exhibit P-18). All the oil
companies were concerned that a short-sighted State policy
of granting lease on top of lease would render impossible
the exploration and production of any hydrocarbons. Thus
the statute contains express authorization and procedure
for converting a partial lease into a single, integrated, work-

able lease embracing all hydrocarbons. Section 65-1-96 provides (in pertinent part) :
" ... the land board may permit such lessees to convert such existing leases to the form of lease which
shall be adopted by the board pursuant to authority
contained in this act, ... "
Certainly when the present partial lease is re-negotiated
to embrace all the hydrocarbons from which petroleum is
sought (that is, for which the "purpose" is extraction of
petroleum) royalty adjustments can and should be made.
That is precisely what Section 65-1-96 U. C. A. contemplated and what, in fact, the Board has done on a number
of occasions, particularly following. the. decision of this
Court in the 1968 Morgan case. If any attitude deserves
the sobriquet "dog in the manger" it is that of the Director
of the Board - who continues to insist, despite well
established geologic findings, and the clear mandate of this
Court in the 1968 Morgan case, that the Board will go
ahead with lease on top of lease on top of lease, despite
the statutory prohibition and the resulting irreparable destruction of the bright chances for development of Utah's
hydrocarbon reserves.
The defendants urge, on rehearing, that the Court take
judicial notice of certain extraneous materials and in particular an electronic recording. To do so would require a
great stretching of the judicial notice statute. The plaintiffs, in turn, suggest that if the Court is, as the dissent
evidently is, troubled by the motives of the plaintiffs, the
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Court, as the judicial notice statute expressly provides,11
consider the records of the Board of 1State Lands which
show that:
1. These plaintiffs have paid or caused to be
paid in excess of $1,000,000 in lease rentals to the
State;

2. These plaintiffs have brought into Utah
State lease acquisition and activity a number of
major petroleum companies (including, Shell, PanAmerican, Husky, Gulf, Alcoa, Kerr-McGee, Texaco,
etc.); (see, also, Exhibit P-1).
3. These plaintiffs have retained only very
small overriding royalties on most of these lands
and stand to profit, if at all, only when those lands
some day actually produce petroleum.
Plaintiffs' motive is not at all to impede leasing of
lands they do not own nor to impose any burdens on the
Board. Far from it. Their motive, as it was in the 1968
Morgan case involving bituminous sands, simply to assure
that short-sighted, prohibited leasing policies of the Board
not be allowed to go unchallenged where such policies create such irremediable conflicts as would ruin the encouraging prospects for hydrocarbon development in Utah. Of
course plaintiffs seek to realize profits some day from oil
shale development. But the revenue to the State Uniform
School Fund from royalties from production (as distinguished from the small lease rentals on lands not being
produced) would be enormous.
9

See 78-25-1 (3) U. C. A. Each Land Board lease must be approved
by official act of the Board, a division of the executive. Accord:
State Board of Land Commissioners v. Ririe, cited supra at Note 5.
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Apparently what Defendant Hansen means (see Note
8, supra) is that if the Board is foreclosed from taking in
the revenue from lease on top of lease on top of lease,, the
short run income may decrease. However, the modest in.
itial fee to the state for lease rental is miniscule compared
to the prospective production royalty income the State will
derive should these lands actually produce. Instead of a
few cents per acre, the State would realize royalties such
as 12112 % of the gross sales, etc. Development of the oil
shale in-situ - the only economically feasible method (see
Exhibits P-6 and P-14 cited and quoted supra) - will require the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars. Only
a major oil company can commit such large sums. And
these plaintiffs - and indeed, the defendants, too - well
know that a major oil company will undertake such
an immense project only when it is certain that its leases
are workable and without conflict. No company is about
to invest the money required when the possibility existB
that another lessee may challenge the source of the liquid
petroleum derived from the in-situ retorting. The statutory
construction urged by the defendants suggests the agoniz·
ing questions which might arise in the future at some well
head in Utah's Uintah Basin:
"What is the source of this oil?"
"Who owns it?"
"Was it produced from the in-situ retorting on
lessee A's shale lease? From the liquid pool em·
braced within lessee B's lease? Or from the bitum·
inous sands leased by C ?"
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This hopeless conflict will never arise if the statute is
accorded the construction adopted by the unanimous 1968
Morgan decision and the majority opinion in the case at
bar. But, in fact, the questions would almost certainly
never arise even if the defendants are permitted to create
such disastrous conflict because no company large enough
and possessed of sufficient technical expertise to undertake
in-situ development would ever even consider such an undertaking while the possibility of such conflict could arise.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have tried herein to point out the factual
errors urged upon the Court by the defendants and adopted
by the dissenting opinion. It would, indeed, as the defendants suggest, be most useful to the petroleum industry
if the opinion of the Court on these important matters could
be one of unanimity, by the dissenting members of this
Court seeing their way clear to join the majority. The
majority opinion is right on in its interpretation of the
subject statute, the legislative purpose, and assures a favorable climate for accelerated shale oil development and
the resulting revenues to the State.
Respectfully submitted,

ADAM M. DUNCAN

Attorney for
Plaintiffs and Respondents

